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conclude that because single-point-estimates result in better decisions
for shareholders this technique is superior to simulation.
Let us assume, for the time being, that their analysis and
conclusion vis-a-vis shareholders is correct. This is not a sufficient
reason to conclude that the information about project risk that simulation
provides is irrelevant in the analysis of capital expenditures. Students of
organizational behavior are well aware of the fact that business organization
have multiple goals [1, pp. 27-32] and that management responds to the
desires of many groups that interact with the business or participate in it.
Indeed, management is more apt to engage in "satisficing" a number of these
groups than in maximizing shareholder wealth [5, p. 169]. Accordingly,
we must determine if the improved appreciation of risk that simulation
provides will increase the ability of management to attain the multiple
goals of a business or help them "satisfice" the groups that interact with
or participate in it.
Will an analysis of risk help the manager keep his job (by not
being known as the instigator of a failed project)? Will it help provide
steady employment by preventing the dislocation that might occur if a major
project failed? Will it help prevent a community from losing its industrial
base by helping a firm avoid bankruptcy? Clearly the answer to these
questions is yes.
Stockholders with a diversified portfolio are unique in that they
can balance and offset the risks and rewards of multiple undertakings.
Not all investors, communities, employees, and/or managers have this
opportunity. For them the result of a single project is very important.

ocially responsible managers must consider the possible consequences of
heir decisions on those persons and groups that cannot diversify, and
he best way to consider these possible consequences is through an analysis
f risk. Simulation is important because it helps provide information
bout risk.
PROJECT RISK AND STOCKHOLDER RISK
Although we believe management does not and should not only
onsider the impact of capital expenditures on shareholders with diversif-
ied portfolios, we do agree that management should consider the interests
f such persons. L 5 L argue that simulation is inferior to point estimates
hen management is concerned with the interests of shareholders. We do
at believe that L § L have substantiated their argument against the use
f simulation for this purpose. Nor do we believe that the alternate model
resented by L fi L is appropriate in its context or practical.
reject's Own Risk
L § L*s case against simulation models is based, in part, on the
negation that a project's risk, or own-variance, is "irrelevant." They
?gue that "Not only Sharpe [6] [7] and Lintner [3] [4] , but a growing list
? their intellectual descendants ... have in fact established that the
le irrelevant feature of an asset's prospective returns is its 'own risk'
~ the outcome uncertainties unique to the asset itself." [2, p. 29] We
isagree with this interpretation of the capital market models of Sharpe
id Lintner. Indeed, tliis statement appears to be inconsistent with
§ L's explanation of Sharpe 's expected return equation, where L § L state:

"Significantly, the own-variance of the security itself o?
,
enters this
expression only throu^^h o- being implied in the covariance term a^^ .
It is therefore relevant only to the extent that there exists a correlation
of outcomes between security j and portfolio m." [2, p. 30]
It is also worth noting that Lintner does not regard an asset's
"own-risk" as "irrelevant" in corporate capital budgeting. According to
Lintner:
"...for a company whose stock is traded in the market ... the
minimum expected return (in dollars of expected present value)
required to justify the allocation of funds to a given risky
project is shown to be an increasing function of each of the
following factors: (i) the risk-free rate of return; (ii) the
•market price of (dollar) risk'; (iii) the vari ance in the
project's ov,Ti present value return (italics ours); (iv) the
project's aggregate present value return-covariance with assets
already held by the company, and (v) its total covariance
with other projects concurrently included in the capital budget.
All five factors are involved explicitly in the corresponding
(derived) formula for the minimum acceptable expected rate of
return on an investment project." [3, p. 14]
L 5 L's argument continues with the assertion that simulation
"... does not reveal how the distribution displayed interacts with the other
distributions of return confronted by the firm in its concurrent projects
or by investors in their personal portfolios. Insofar as the analyst relies
on that display, he may render notably perverse judgements." [2, pp. 29-30]
k
According to L § L:
"The compelling virtue of tho traditional single-point value
analysis is that it can incorporate the necessary recognition
of market -dependency. Sharpe [6] [7] has shoun that, under
the pressure of investor portfolio construction, asset yields
will tend to equilibrate in the capital market in such a way
that the expected returns on all risky securities will be
related to the default-free rate ..." [2, p. 30]
L 5 L associate the findings of Sharpe for securities to the general case
of capital expenditure analysis. No evidence is offered to show that
the assumptions of capital market theory hold in capital expenditure analysis;
nor do L 5 L substantiate the implied assumption that firms hold diversified
portfolios of assets. We do not question the findings of the Sharpe model
as applied to securities, but we hold suspect L § L's implied assertion
that those findings are applicable in all capital expenditure analyses.
L S L's Alternate Model
Our final comments concern L 5 L's "alternative model," where they
claim that "This discipline of the marketplace, and the risky-asset prices
it enforces, means that a "reading" of required expected returns is possible
from observable data." [2, p. 30] We question this inference. Does it hold
for new products, one-of-a-kind projects, or in a changing economic environ-
ment? L 5 L add that "All the analyst need do in evaluating a project is
to identify the prevailing yield on investments in lines of business similar
to the one being contemplated -- i.e., in activities of corresponding

•market relatedness' ." [2, p. 30] We first must ask, what is "market
relatedness"? L 5 L offer no definition of this term. We also question
the practicallity of obtaining financial data from other companies, partic-
ularly companies "in lines of business similar to the one beinp; contemplated,"
which, presumably are competitors.
L 5 L continue:
"He (the analyst) should then apply that yield as the discount
rate against the expected (single point) annual cash flows of
the project at issue. If it has a positive present value as
thereby derived, it should be accepted; if not, rejected. In
most instances, this procedure simply involves measuring a firm's
cost of capital, since cost of capital is^ the equivalent for a
firm of the oj in the equation above." [2, p-p. 30-31]
L § L use a reference to Sharpe as justification for this statement. We
do not understand how this statement was derived from their Sharpe reference,
which is given in its entirety below.
"The security market line can be used directly as a criterion
for the acceptance or rejection of investment projects by a
firm. The key is to consider such a project as a potential
security to be held by the firm's ouTiers. Thus, if a project
' plots above the security market line, it should be accepted;
if it plots below the line, it should be rejected. In more
traditional terms, the cost of capital for a project is the
expected rate of return shown by th e security market line for
projects of equal volatility ." "The expected dollar cash flow
should be discounted at this rate of interest; if the present

value is positive, the project should be undertaken; if not,
it should be rejected." (italics added) [7, p. 94, footnote]
Sharpe is not advocating discounting a project at the firm's cost of
capital, but the expected return of projects of equal volatility.
Even if we follow this "model" vis-a-vis Sharpe 's explanation,
we encounter problems. Projects of equal volatility are investments that
have the same covariance with the market, assuming that the variance
of the market is constant. We suspect that the analyst would encounter
estimation problems for this formulation. In addition, the "model" is
unclear in the situation where alternative projects are considered. If
the alternative projects have different volatilities, it is unclear what
rate of return should be used to discount the projects. Two different
volatilities result in two discount rates, one for each project. Should
we pick the project with the highest net present value, based upon the
fact that the projects are discounted at different rates?
CONCLUSION
Vie feel that the arguments presented in the last section of L 5 L's
paper do not support their conclusion that "the information provided by
simulation is, at best, no better than is generated by the traditional
single -point present value approach, and in one very important respect, is
markedly inferior." [2, p. 19]
1
FOOTNOTES
The expected return is given by:
where R. is the expected rate of return, i is the risk-free interest rate,
K^ is the expected return of the market portfolio, a^^ is the covariance
between the security j and the market, and a^ is the variance of market
returns.
2Volatility is defined as the covariance between security j and
the market divided by the variance of market returns. This expression is
(—4—), which is contained in the last term in footnote 1 above,
in
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